Frederick the Great: Tactical Genius or Lucky Opportunist? (Part 2/3)
Frederick’s military background & experiences.
This series has so far established that the necessary infrastructure and resources were in place to support Frederick’s Silesia campaign. Yet there are other factors directly connected to Frederick II to consider, such as his own experiences of war on the Rhine and the infamous ‘Herstall incident’. Both these experiences were also significant in that they either gave the crown prince some perception of disarray to be found in Austrian war camps, or foreshadowed his strategy against Silesia later that year to some extent.
Finally, there is also the actual weakness of Austria in 1740 to be considered. By Frederick II’s accession, Austria’s army numbered only slightly higher than that of Prussia’s, and her military administration was still somewhat reeling from the poor performances seen against the Turks in the final years of Charles VI’s reign. Coinciding with this was the heavy concessions the Emperor had been making in an effort to secure the Pragmatic Sanction for when his daughter would become the head Imperial sovereign, an accession which Frederick II, along with some other contemporary rulers, assumed most states would not respect. Overall, this chapter will analyse many of the above factors in their contribution or accommodation towards Frederick II’s decision to lead troops into Silesia.
On the Rhine With Eugene of Savoy
The vast majority of Frederick II’s time as an adult crown prince was spent away from the battlefield, whether it was under his period of essential house-arrest by Frederick William, the following years of attempting to please his father through the drilling of his regiment of command, or the time he spent in the later 1730s preparing for his accession. However, when the Polish sovereign Augustus II died in 1733, war soon followed as the Bourbon powers vied to have their candidate Stanislaus I take the throne whilst Russia, backed by the Imperial powers, made the first move in its efforts to have Augustus III take the kingship of Poland. The following year Frederick William sent his son, along with a Prussian contingent, to join Imperial forces on the Rhine for several weeks. The king made this decision with the expectation that his son would be exposed to actual warfare and gain some valuable experience of the realities of commanding whilst shadowing the legendary field marshal Prince Eugene of Savoy.
Frederick II’s time accompanying the Austrian forces is significant to this analysis for two important reasons. First and foremost because living in-camp with the famed Eugene and witnessing the formulation of battle strategies would combine to leave a lasting effect on the crown prince, and secondly, being exposed to the Austrian disarray during the campaign may certainly have left some impression on Frederick as to the quality of their troops. In regards the first point mentioned above, Eugene did succeed in teaching Frederick some valuable lessons of war and strategy during his time in the camp, such as advice on the way of thinking about war as a sovereign.
Possibly one of the most significant of these pieces of advice was that of seizing risky opportunities should they arise, one that we certainly see reflected in Frederick’s notes and behaviour around his attack into Silesia. Crucially, this example not only suggests Eugene left an impression on the crown prince, but also that this impression may have influenced Frederick’s strategy for Silesia. In support of this point, the notes show Frederick considering all of the major European players in his decisions for Silesia, ‘England and France are at loggerheads; if France interferes in the affairs of the Empire, England can never allow it… Russia alone might be able to cause difficulties for us.’ Frederick is ‘thinking large’ as advised by Eugene, and furthermore, this begins to support the idea that his decision to attack Silesia was based more so in strategically thought-out opportunism, as is evident from his weighing of probabilities, rather that of rash decision-making.
Frederick’s Criticisms of the Austrians
As mentioned, the second significant consequence of Frederick II’s time on the Rhine was his exposure to what he perceived as disarray and poor leadership in the Austrian camp. There are a number of details that many historians bring mention to regarding this aspect of the crown prince’s experience, resulting in some pattern of agreement among scholars as to what effect it had on him. There is certainly a general consensus among the secondary source material that Frederick was overly critical of Eugene’s strategies at the time, believing the older man to be slow and overly hesitant in his decisions, especially on the loss of Phillipsburg to the French, which Frederick believed to be the fault of Eugene’s ‘overly static’ campaign. While it is certainly beyond doubt that the crown prince was somewhat naïve in his criticisms of the field marshal, it is also important to note that by this time it had been two years since Frederick’s readmittance to the army and over a year since he had been appointed command of regiment Goltz.
Thus, while these judgements were made by someone inexperienced in war, they should not be completely disregarded as uneducated considering the crown prince did at least have a background in the military. There is huge significance solely in that, less than ten years later, Frederick II would instigate war with the very forces he was now making camp with, which not only supports the level of analysis so far, but also bears demand for further examination into the matter. Thus, it should be asked if evidence of this critical perception of the Austrian troops resurfaced in Frederick’s decision-making regarding Silesia. While it is somewhat difficult to identify explicit examples where he alludes to his time on the Rhine, the King does make reference to Eugene’s lacking ability in old age in his later writings. Overall, Frederick’s time spent alongside Eugene can be considered influential over the young king’s decisions regarding Silesia, as it not only gave him some degree of a preconceived perception of Austrian military weakness, but also saw him adopt some of the advice given from the commander he had targeted with such a critical lens.
First Conflict as King — The Herstall Incident
While all analysis thus far has focused on history before Frederick II’s accession to the throne, the months between him becoming king and attacking Silesia are indeed extremely relevant to the objective of this series, primarily due to the Herstall crisis. The barony of Herstall had been acquired by Frederick William at the Treaty of Utrecht, however, it had always remained under the influence of the bishop of nearby Liège. When Frederick came to the throne he looked to Herstall as an excuse to show he would not shy away from conflict in the same way his father had, and when his efforts to gain support from foreign courts fell short, he instead demanded in letter that the Bishop formally declare his suzerainty and whether he was prepared to defend it. When the Bishop failed to reply immediately, Frederick took swift action and sent an overwhelming force to capture the town of nearby Maaseyk, leaving the Bishop helpless and forcing him to pay 200,000 thalers to the King in exchange for Herstall.
Such a move by the king was extremely risky considering the Bishop was supported by France, however, no other states intervened, a reaction that is often considered a huge contributing factor in the Prussian king’s decision to attack neighbouring Silesia later that year, and further explains the large army mobilisation undertaken for it. Frederick later explains in The history of my own times that his behaviour regarding Herstall was in line with his belief that new kings should start their reign with ‘marks of determination’. However, while this principle may seem to support the argument that the King attacked Silesia out of sheer opportunism, a point he himself even makes in 1741, there is again evidence to suggest his attack was more calculated and planned than first appears.
The Strategy Behind Herstall
The Herstall incident was certainly to some degree an aggravated and brute use of force, which also went against the advice of Frederick’s ministers, however, Frederick in fact knew the possible consequences of the occupation, but believed they were unlikely and that the Bishop would immediately capitulate in the face of overwhelming force. Of course he was correct in this assumption, yet it also shows at least some degree of strategy and planning, as Frederick weighed some of the possible consequences of using force against the Herstallians. Significantly, the King was well aware at the time that both France and England were vying for his favour, and thus less likely to intrude on his actions against the Bishop of Liege. Furthermore, as mentioned, the incident may partly explain both the Prussian attack into Silesia later that year as well as the attack’s large scale. Frederick ultimately met no resistance to his occupation of Maaseyk from foreign powers, which historians, and even contemporaries of the King some years after, believed was a crucial deciding factor in the Prussian aggression exercised against Silesia several months later.
However, again the more likely motivations for the attack can be linked to Frederick thinking ‘large’, as Eugene had previously advised him on the Rhine. In terms of the role foreign powers would play in the King’s decision, he believed that the larger European powers would all move against Austria following Charles’ death, and that if he did not act first, Prussia would be left in a weaker and more vulnerable position on the European stage. Thus, while it would be inaccurate to say that the expectation of little to no foreign interference in response to the conquering of Silesia motivated Frederick in the same way as it had for Herstall, it was not an incorrect assumption, but only because it appeared many powers were preparing for similar endeavours against Austria following the emperor’s death.
Finally, in tying more directly with this series’ question, this analysis of the Herstall incident, and the Prussian King’s thinking behind it, shows that while he certainly may have been rash and overly quick in the decision by ignoring his ministers, there was a strategy and much consideration behind it. Furthermore, while Herstall was an opportunity seized partly for the display of power and prestige it would symbolise to other European states, it was also seized by a young monarch as a means to assert power early in his reign rather than ‘mildness’.
Austrian Vulnerability in 1740
While this article has focused thus far on factors either closely or just directly related to Frederick II, another extremely significant point of deliberation for the King in his battle plan was the level of Austria’s weakness by the time of his accession, and certainly the vulnerability of the Habsburg possessions in the wake of Charles VI’s death.
There were a number of reasons for this considerable weakness. Austria had just exited from the taxing Russo-Turkish War, which had ended for them with defeat at Grocka, and therefore the military was in a poor and unsettled state. Primarily as a result of the recent war and the need to leave a military presence in Hungary, Silesia was essentially devoid of any significant Austrian troop presence in 1740, further adding to the overall weak perception of the Imperial force’s capability to successfully defend or recapture Silesia from Prussian attack. In addition, Austria’s lead in physical military strength had shrunk significantly, so that by 1740 its lead was less than 10,000, with both armies numbering around 100,000 men. While this military weakness alone is only one among several elements contributing to Austrian vulnerability at the time, it is yet still a relevant one, as even Frederick himself explains it was certainly a factor in his decision, thus supporting the argument that this young King had both planning and strategy behind his attack.
In addition to this was the Pragmatic Sanction, another contributing factor in weakening the Austrian military strength that Fredrick was aware of. In the twenty years that Charles VI had been attempting to secure the agreement he had made many concessions to other states in exchange for their recognition and acceptance of it. These concessions materialised as payoffs and territorial deals with other states, and even a costly war with the Turks on behalf of the commitments made to Russia, all linked to his attempts in securing the agreement. Frederick not only believed the integrity of the sanction would immediately be compromised following the Emperor’s death, which is reflected in his notes prior to the invasion, but he also describes in his later writings of the concessions Charles made and how, in the end, the King’s reign finished miserably in comparison to its beginning. This ultimately supports the argument that the Prussian King was well aware of the affect the Pragmatic Sanction had on Austria, and the lack of security it truly provided the succession, thus adding a more strategic element to his decision to attack almost immediately after the Emperor’s death.
The Plan for Maria Theresa
It is generally agreed that Frederick hoped for a brief conflict whereupon he could use overwhelming force and speed to capture a large portion of Silesia, thus intimidating Maria Theresa into simply accepting the outcome, both because he knew she would be out of her depth militarily, but also because he would offer some beneficial terms to Austria in return. While this is certainly similar to the premise of his plan for Herstall earlier that year, the key difference here was that Frederick was willing, and therefore planned, to fight (albeit not in an all-out European war) for Silesia if necessary, as is evident from both his notes pre-invasion, as well as his private talks with his ministers in the wake of Charles’ death.
In addition, Frederick was aware of the difficult and unstable position Charles’ daughter would find herself in during, and immediately after, her accession. He therefore believed, as was previously mentioned, that he should act both swiftly and decisively against Austrian vulnerability, before other European powers could capitalise on her weakness. Overall, the strategy and planning around the Prussian king’s attack is apparent from both his correct understanding of the predatory political climate that would follow Maria Theresa’s crowning, to his preparations for attaining the valuable province of Silesia through either blackmail or a short war.
Opinions of Scholars & Conclusion
It should be noted at this point in the analysis that H.M. Scott describes the young king as lacking strategic calculation during the first year of his reign, with reference to Frederick’s account of the attack as one of youthful vanity, whilst other scholars, such as Sebastian Haffner, warn of the Prussian King’s tendency to be ‘self-mocking’, and that the attack was planned seriously. While there was certainly an element of opportunism in the King’s decision to attack Silesia, it was one that was taken out of a perceived strategic necessity, where Frederick believed Charles VI’s death would leave Austria so vulnerable that other European powers would move to seize Habsburg possessions, and therefore he needed to do so first for the benefit of Prussia. While this was not the sole reason for his decision, this examination has shown it to be an integral part of it in the latter half of the analysis. Furthermore, it has been established that Frederick was influenced by the strategic advice of Eugene, and that this was reflected by his actions towards the Austrian province, a point which supports this series’ argument for ‘strategy over glory’.
Sources:
Dan D. Y. Shapira, ‘The Crimean Tatars and the Austro-Ottoman Wars’ in C. Ingrao, G. Cohen and F. Szabo (eds) The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718 (Indiana, 2011)
Asprey, Robert B., Frederick the Great: the magnificent enigma (New York, 1999)
Sutton, John L. The king’s honor & the king’s cardinal: The War of the Polish Succession (Kentucky, 1980)
McKay, Derek, Prince Eugene of Savoy (London, 1977)
Frederick II (“the Great”), Notes to Himself on the Invasion of Silesia, 1740 (G.H.D.I.)
MacDonogh, Giles, Frederick the Great: a life in deed and letters (New York, 2000)
Hubatsch, Walther, Frederick the Great of Prussia: absolutism and administration (London, 1975)
Frederick II, The history of my own times. Part I. Translated from the French by Thomas Holcroft (London, 1789) in Vol 1 of imprints by Luke White (Dublin, 1791)
Showalter, Dennis E., The wars of Frederick the Great (New York, 1996).
H.M. Scott, ‘Prussia’s emergence as a European great power, 1740–1763’ in P.G. Dwyer (ed.) The Rise of Prussia, 1700–1830 (UK,
2000).Haffner, Sebastian, The rise and fall of Prussia (London, 1980)
Wilson, Peter H., From Reich to revolution: German history, 1558–1806 (Basingstoke, 2004)
Black, Jeremy, The Origins of war in early modern Europe (Edinburgh, 1987)
