Frederick the Great: Tactical Genius or Lucky Opportunist? (Part 3/3)

Exercising strategic advantage.

Part II covered the relevance of Frederick II’s experience on the Rhine, as well as his actions in the Herstall incident, and linked these to his attack against Silesia. All this in order to support the argument that his invasion of Silesian territory in 1740 was founded more in strategic calculation rather than sheer opportunism. This was further supported with shorter reference to his being aware of the weak position Austria found itself in after Charles VI’s many concessions regarding the Pragmatic Sanction, the war with the Ottomans, and his hopes for the Empresses’ capitulation in the face of overwhelming force.

This chapter will focus on expanding on some of these points further, such as Maria Theresa’s ill preparedness and Frederick’s correct perception of the political climate and that other states would follow his lead in some sense. There will also be an examination of other elements of strategy which factored into the King’s decision, such as the superiority of his forces in both number and, in many respects, quality, including the geographical advantages he would have by attacking Silesia.

Finally, there will also be a brief reference to Austria’s inability to muster support as it traditionally did from the Reich and how Frederick capitalized on this to some degree by receiving troops from other princes, and a concluding discussion will be made centred around the battle of Mollwitz. Overall, this chapter will discuss how many of the above elements factored into Frederick’s planning for Silesia, thus supporting the argument that his was an attack of strategic timing and calculation.

Maria Theresa’s Austria

When Maria Theresa took authority of the Austrian state following her father’s death in October 1740, she found herself “without money, troops or counsel”, something Frederick, like many other contemporary rulers, had foreseen to some degree. Indeed Maria inherited the state at one of its most vulnerable periods of the eighteenth century, with a feeble treasury and weak local military power.

With an intimate understanding of this and building off his knowledge that Austria would be targeted by many of the local European powers during her predicted succession crisis, the Prussian king had begun preparing his forces for some form of movement even before the Emperor’s death, and had made secret talks with France regarding attacks on a second front. This not only again ties in with the aforementioned advice to ‘think large and plan’ he received from Eugene on the Rhine, but is also evident of some level of grand strategy and calculation by the Prussian King.

Furthermore, Frederick was well aware of the large percentage of Austrian troops still quartered in Hungary and had a general understanding of how weakly defended Silesia remained with less than 8,000 Imperial troops stationed in the mostly neglected defences dotted around the province. Frederick was thus planning to overwhelm the Austrians and, by having at least France as a guaranteed aggressor following his invasion, he could be more certain Maria Theresa would simply capitulate to his terms rather than risk fighting a war on multiple fronts.

Frederick’s predictions of the ensuing political climate and planning with France would all reveal to have been quite accurate, with Bavaria, France and Saxony all launching attacks against the Habsburgs soon after his initial push into Silesia. The young king’s notes on the war were mostly accurate in the general terms of their predictions therefore, further supporting the argument that his attack of the province was one of strategy and planning.

Prussian Grand Strategy

This article has referenced the strategy and tied it into Frederick II’s decision to attack neighbouring Silesia multiple times, however, what exactly was this strategy in the broader sense and in strategic military terms? Thus far it has largely been attached to either Frederick’s experiences before October 1740, to the accommodating strategic and militaristic advantages provided to him by the state his father crafted, or to the plans he had to for forcing Maria to accept his terms for Silesia in the face of overwhelming force.

Part of the conclusion to the first chapter of this series discussed how the state created by Frederick William I was one which prioritized its disproportionately large military with the expectation of applying its powerful militaristic arm in the acquisition of territory which it badly needed in order to thrive as a European power. With this in mind, one must consider how the Prussian King’s plans for Silesia were largely motivated by a perceived necessity to gain territory and therefore power in order to give Prussia a serious foothold on the ‘European stage’ of powers, a point supported by the fact that throughout the initial invasion and ensuing war, acquiring Silesia remained his primary objective. This argument shows elements of grand strategy contributing to the Prussian invasion of Silesia in 1740.

Furthermore, following the level of opportunism in the King’s motivation and execution of attack, it should be understood that there was some degree of it factored into his decisions. However, this opportunism was based off a pre-existing knowledge of operational movements, such as Herstall, and Austrian ill-preparedness as was discussed above and in chapter two. In addition, Frederick was well aware of the superiority of his own troops, both in quality and quantity.

Firstly, the Prussian military had a vastly larger local military force than the Austrian, with over 80,000 troops capable of mobilization within the timeframe of a rapid assault, and on top of this, there was virtually no threat of attack from local powers. In terms of army quality, the Prussians also held the majority of advantage, as they were extremely well equipped with weapons by contemporary standards, and Prussian soldiers were among the best drilled in Europe, achieving both an impressive rate of fire and efficiency in battle manoeuvrability.

Geography & Logistics

In addition to this, there were hugely significant geographical advantages taken into account by the King for his attack. In terms of strategic advantages, the only real and immediate threat posed by an attack into Silesia was the small frontier with Saxony, yet the King was confident that could be handled, and otherwise he had many advantages such as the lack of mountainous area along the Prussian front with Silesia.

Frederick made good use of this by pushing fast into Silesia and with an overwhelming force, therefore managing to successfully capture the vast majority of the region in only seven weeks, yet again evidence of strategic calculation and, even determination, which would have been unlikely had his attack been one of rushed opportunism.

Following up on this point, Frederick was also aware of the logistical value of the rivers running through Silesia offered to his campaign, and thus secured them rapidly following his push across the Silesian border, critically allowing him to take full advantage of the transport capabilities offered by the Oder, which ran deep into the Habsburg territory.

Frederick’s Strategy

This point, in conjunction with that of the above paragraph, support the image of that of a king who had planned his moves and calculated his objectives appropriately, as Frederick used both speed and a large force with the aim of either overwhelming Maria Theresa into accepting his terms for Silesia, or putting himself in the most advantageous position should a somewhat protracted war ensue his actions. To expand on this latter point, Frederick was well aware of the valuable industries located in the Silesian plains and that should he be pulled into war, he could make use of the bountiful deposits of coal and iron and large forests in funding or contributing to the war effort. The King references the value of the province again in his later writings, describing how its acquisition added a huge new revenue stream to the crown, which was promptly directed into funding for the military.

Furthermore, Frederick knew the Silesians would not be a problem either and that they would not resist a Prussian takeover to any considerable degree, and in addition, the Prussian king realized the potential recruitment increase the Silesian population presented at around 1,500,000 in 1740. These point further address the reasoning and calculation behind Frederick II’s attack as well as his contingency plan should Maria Theresa reject his terms and begin a war instead. To suggest the Prussian king was motivated by sheer opportunism and to suggest he was rash and lacked foresight in doing so would simply be ignoring all the evidence suggesting otherwise.

In addition, while Frederick did seize the opportunity for attack following the Emperor’s death, he did so immediately and efficiently, thus capitalising on the confusion and unrest he had predicted would follow in the ensuing succession. The King understood the opportunity that had presented itself to him when he heard news of Charles’ death, correctly writing that it would possibly change the European power system and that war was sure to follow in the preceding months, thus he was overloaded with tasks as he prepared a strategy for Silesia.

When Frederick held meeting with his generals on the 28th of October, less than ten days after the Emperor’s death, he had fully committed to his plans for Silesia, and thus pushed forward in preparation, even veiling his intentions from Austrian diplomats, albeit thinly, by professing friendship continuously through his attack preparations. While again his actions were motivated by what Haffner might call an ‘international constellation’ in favour of involvement, Frederick’s planning for an opportunity like such had begun only a month after his accession with increases to soldier numbers, and the level of preparedness of his troops to move by the time of Charles’ death was not simply a result of good luck.

Furthermore, Frederick had taken advantage of another key consequence of the Austrian succession predicament. Following Charles’ death, support for Maria withered among the different sovereigns and suzerainties within the Reich which had traditionally been a source of support for the Habsburgs, thus making it increasingly difficult for her to gain military assistance against the Prussians. Frederick capitalized on this by securing regiments of troops from the princes of Württemberg and Wolfenbüttel. These princes had recruited huge numbers of men for Austrian wars in the 1730s but were unable to maintain them and instead agreed to deliver them to the Prussian king, and crucially this was executed before they knew his plans for Silesia, thus allowing Frederick to bolster his own strength whilst simultaneously alienating some of the local princes further from the Habsburgs. This again shows how the young king had been preparing his military for a politically climate favourably predisposed for him to seize territory, whilst also marking how Frederick himself contributed in creating these favourable conditions.

The Battle of Mollwitz

Finally, this article will shift the focus of its analysis some months ahead, in the timeline examined thus-far, to the Battle of Mollwitz in April 1741. This battle is significant to the topic of discussion not only because it was the first major battle between Imperial and Prussian troops since the Invasion began, but significantly, it also can be used as evidence of a king who was ill prepared and lacked strategic sense. While the battle ended in a victory for the Prussian led by field marshal von Schwerin, Frederick’s cavalry was decimated following an ill-considered order by the King, who himself was forced to leave the battlefield as a result.

The incident certainly could propagate an argument that Frederick’s poor tactics at Mollwitz followed by his fleeing was the resulting behaviour of a king whose lack of preparation for an invasion he had rushed was beginning to show. However, Frederick’s poor cavalry tactics at Mollwitz are better understood as an isolated tactical mishap in a battle which the Prussians won regardless, a victory achieved mostly because of both their advantage in quantity and quality of infantry as well as Maria Theresa’s inability to concentrate her forces due to the opening since of other fronts of battle. The importance of this of course is that the Prussian King had either created these factors for victory or been aware of them and used them to his advantage, both in the leadup to his push into Silesia and the following months. Thus, Frederick’s mishap at Mollwitz is not in any way sufficient as an argument that he was unprepared or lacked strategic knowledge, indeed his mistake was purely a small-scale tactical error, whereas he had been extremely efficient and calculated in his plans for the overall grand strategy for Silesia.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined many aspects of the Prussian King’s military and political planning for his invasion into neighbouring Silesia in 1740. It has established that Frederick’s strategy considered geographical and economic factors within the Austrian territory and what roles they would play in his attack. The military advantages possessed by the Prussian’s was also discussed, as well as the vulnerable and weak position the Habsburgs were left in late 1740 and again, how Frederick capitalized on this and even briefly, how he contributed to it through his transfer of troops from some Imperial princes. Overall, this chapter has expanded on the focus of chapter two by not only showing that Frederick II had a calculated strategy for Silesia, but that this plan was complex and yet was carried out much as he had intended, with the result of a rapid takeover and military victory on the field.

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