Frederick the Great: Tactical Genius or Lucky Opportunist? (Part 1/3)
Influence of reforms under the Soldier King
Frederick William I’s reign from 1713-1740 saw huge administrative, social, financial, military, and agricultural reforms. His militaristic behaviour and absolute rule were two of the key influencing factors on his reign and allowed him to meticulously introduce changes and effectively monitor their application by officials. His complete overhaul of the military and recruiting system as well as the Prussian administration, however, were by far his most significant undertakings.
Frederick William’s reforms created a Prussia for his son to inherit far different than the one he did, one that boasted a large, well trained and equipped standing army, a significant treasury and stable economy and a much more effective administrative structure for the monarch to operate within. Had Frederick William’s transformation of the state been less effective or centralising, especially that of the army, it is certain that at the very least, his son’s Silesian campaign would have been at a much later date, or possibly never would have occurred at all. The Soldier King developed his state to such an extent that when his son took the throne in 1740, he found himself with significant tools and resources at his disposal such as the improved army, and thus it is imperative to examine the reign of Frederick William and how it affected the state when analysing the strategy and motivation behind Frederick II’s attack.
Frederick William’s Administrative Reforms
With his accession to the throne in 1713, Frederick William I immediately did away with the luxuries that had characterized his father’s reign and began implementing what would become huge administrative changes in Brandenburg-Prussia, ultimately pursuing a centralised state by expanding and consolidating Berlin’s authority. He faced huge challenges in doing this, primarily the massive geographical distance between his borders, as well as a scarce population density and powerful local elites. These began in earnest with changes to ministerial schedules, increased regulation of the workload of chanceries, assigning government officials much earlier starting hours and more concise working tasks, and much more importantly, Frederick’s appointment of Prussian nobleman von Walburg in 1715 to oversee provincial administration reforms. Frederick William’s supervision of his reforms
was also immediate and impressive, as the influential Count von Seckendorf noted during his time as an ambassador in the Prussian court, ‘there is such an enormous store of powder, shot, and shells as if a great war was threatening…he looks after the whole public administration in all its branches with such care and thoroughness that not a thaler is spent
unless he has given his signature’.
An extremely important part of Frederick’s reforms was his creation of the General War Commissariat and the General Finance Directory, a military/civil government body and financial body respectively, which in 1723 were merged together to form the all-encompassing General Directory. The General Directory hugely centralised the Prussian state, allowing the monarch to correspond with primarily just one governing body, thus increasing administrative efficiency. These centralising reforms were extremely important in consolidating the king’s power over, as Weigley briefly mentions, a dispersed number of possessions that required good connections in order to be ruled effectively. Frederick William’s establishment of the General Directory, compromising of a number of provincial council-like bodies (each with an extensive list of functions), as well as his expansion of the Fiskal system, were two decisions that together would effectively centralise Brandenburg-Prussia’s government. The King also stated in his instructions for the General Directory’s functions that officials were to be appointed to provincial boards of those regions to which they were not native, which he intended as a measure to deter local connections influencing those in government there.
Thus, through the combined effects of the expanded Fiskal system as well as this ruling of non-native government appointments, the reformed administration of Frederick William was increasingly effective and efficient in carrying out the king’s orders. This perfectly aligned with what Frederick II would consider an absolute necessity in the successful ruling of his territories, that is, a centralised state with the monarch at the focal point of authority, carrying out important tasks with as little dilution into other government officials as possible. Thus, Frederick William firmly established a system of government through extensive reforms, which his son would come to adopt wholly as a vital function of his absolutist rule, and therefore we must consider Frederick II may not have been as confident in an early Silesian campaign without such an efficient and centralised governing administration at his disposal.
Financial Reform Under Frederick William
While the Prussian king’s administrative reforms were extremely important, so too were his changes to taxes and how they were collected. Frederick William’s financial reforms made the whole system of tax collection both more efficient and far-reaching, and this in combination with his extremely conservative spending would boost Prussia’s economy to the point that upon his accession in 1740, Frederick II would have access to a stash of roughly eight million thalers in the king’s personal savings. However, other than some areas of the Westphalian regions, Brandenburg-Prussia was not naturally rich in raw resources such as metals and fertile farming soil, and in combination with a significantly low population density in comparison to other contemporary states meant achieving a profitable economy and economic self-sufficiency were huge dilemmas for the king.
Frederick William made many reforms and amendments in pursuing his objective of a financially self-sufficient state, such as strict supervision of the state revenue streams and his enforcement of excise taxes in conjunction with the establishment of government market dominance of many products. His appointment of the aforementioned von Walburg to provincial administration also proved to be an important contributing factor to the improvement of Brandenburg-Prussia’s economy and government revenue, as Walburg successfully relieved some of the fiscal pressure on peasants through his tax reforms. Walburg did this while also achieving a rise in agrarian production and successful implementation of the significant General Hide Tax, both further increasing crown revenue. It is important also to note that Frederick William’s fiscal reforms came on the back of his administrative ones, and would not have been as effective had the latter not been implemented well. However, the king’s control was not watertight, and a somewhat consistent issue he faced was inaccurate reports from his officials, who were wary to deliver bad news to their monarch from fear of penalty, which resulted in the monarch oftentimes trying to address and remedy this issue. Despite administrative issues such as this, the Soldier King’s fiscal reforms were overarching and effective in improving the state’s economic efficiency and revenue, resulting by the end of his reign in the financially self-sufficient Brandenburg-Prussia he had set out for early after his accession. This work also acknowledges Frederick William’s extensive agrarian reforms, especially regarding the reclamation of farming/habitable land and the improvements made to the Prussian grain market, both of which successfully stimulated the state economy and productivity. In conclusion, moving, feeding, billeting and equipping an army are some of the major expenses Frederick II had to consider in his decision to attack neighbouring Silesia. Influencing such thoughts were the improved state economy as established and checked by his father, which would have an impressive annual revenue of seven million thalers by 1740.
The Soldier King & His New Military
This chapter places much emphasis thus far on the extensive and successful administrative and economic reforms of Frederick William I as factors that put the fiscal and administrative infrastructure and resources in place that made his son’s decision to advance into Silesia possible. However, the primary accommodating factor on Frederick II’s decision, in this chapter, will be placed on his father’s changes and improvements to the Prussian military. Frederick William was a military man through and through and carried out almost all his changes to the state through a militaristic lens, and significantly, he reformed the government with the main focus placed on satisfying the requirements of the military, oftentimes placing officers in administrative roles to further this goal. The king’s most important changes to the military were the introduction of the canton system, his integration of the nobility and his improvement in the quality of soldier at the state’s disposal. These reforms completely changed the Prussian military so that by the end of his reign the army was effectively double in size and considered one of the best in Europe, despite Prussia’s meagre population. These changes put a significant capacity for both effectively and efficiently waging war at Frederick II’s disposal and therefore may be considered crucial factors when investigating the motives and strategy behind the attack into Silesia in 1740.
Brandenburg-Prussia was, in the early eighteenth century, two main separated territories with a weak army and poor defence capabilities. While Frederick William I was unwilling to aggressively expand his territory, he did put huge effort into establishing a system of recruitment that would increase the state’s standing army to a size vastly disproportionate to the population pool he could draw from, especially in comparison to other similar contemporary states. This effort materialised in the implementation of the canton system of recruitment which was finalised in 1733, through which the king could effectively muster a far larger number of troops from his subjects, allowing for less dependence on expensive foreign mercenaries and more focus on a large Prussian standing army. The canton system would be altered somewhat over the century, but Frederick II would rely heavily on it for all of his future campaigns. The system worked by dividing the kingdom based on the density of hearths in certain areas, and once divided, all unmarried males in each district who were within the age brackets were enrolled on regimental lists, and Frederick William tactfully prevented any significant opposition by providing a standard rate of pay and considerable furloughs in peacetime. Another important factor in preventing opposition to the system was the exceptions it made for many classes types of subjects, for example, the exemption of farm and homeowners, which doubled as an effective measure in maintaining the productivity of agrarian activities. The system operated efficiently, and Frederick William’s measures taken in preventing where he predicted opposition could arise allowed the system of recruitment to be used even more effectively by his son.
Furthermore, the canton system of recruitment managed to significantly subdue the slightly high peacetime attrition rate in the Prussian military, which prior to its implementation, stood at a rate of 6 per cent per year, and afterwards would decrease to about 4 per cent despite the army’s growth in size from some 40,000 around 1713 to roughly 80,000 men by 1740. Overall, the canton system, with its efficient operation, minimal opposition and a huge increase of the Prussian standing army, was hugely influential on state foreign policy in the later years of Frederick William’s reign and throughout the entirety of his son’s rule, certainly accommodated his decision to move his army against Austria in 1740.
The subordination of the nobility and, more importantly, their widescale
implementation into the military officer cadre was another significant part of the king’s military reforms. By establishing the Prussian Junkers as the dominant officer class Frederick was essentially bringing them closer to crown influence, therefore allowing the monarch to exercise his will more effectively on them. This was achieved in a number of ways, first worth noting, however, is that even the canton system contributed to the military integration of the nobility by creating an incentive for Junkers to undertake recruiting in their locality through the potential payoff of higher personal status. Other measures included the establishment of cadet academies starting early in Frederick’s reign, such as the one in Berlin,
which also acted as an incentive to integrate with military life, especially for poorer Junkers who saw the schools as means to bring status to their family. Furthermore, after graduating the cadets received larger commissions, and while there was not an insignificant amount of opposition to these new policies, especially after the decreed increase in annual intake to the academies in 1738, the measures were ultimately effective in integrating the nobility and subordinating them through their dependency on military commission. Thus, as Clark sums up well, Frederick William’s successful absorption of the Junkers into the military subsequently moved the potential of this class of nobility within the state influence, unlocking what would become an important and vast officer cadre for the Prussian army.
The king’s military reform did not only concern the size of the army and the officers within it, however. An extremely important element in his improvements was that of new training drills, new battlefield manoeuvres, and better equipment. Frederick drilled his soldiers excessively, so that the Prussian line was, by the later years of his reign, considered the best drilled in Europe, and their adoption of the more effective iron ramrod and their focus on fast and fluid battle manoeuvres certainly aligned with this idea.
Frederick William I - In Conclusion
Overall, the reign of Frederick William I was one of extensive and far-reaching reform and change in every part of the government and military administrations and systems. Frederick’s influence was exceedingly effective at improving the efficiency and revenue of the government, while also increasing the size and quality of the army and its classes. Seckendorf summarised much of this point well when he noted how impressive the king’s army and administrative style appeared to be. Had his son inherited the same state as his father had in 1713, a Brandenburg-Prussia with poor economic and administrative practices and a weak and poorly structured military, it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty that he would not have attacked neighbouring Silesia in 1740.
Sources:
Philip G. Dwyer, ‘Introduction: The Rise of Prussia’ & Rodney Gothelf, ‘Frederick William and the beginnings of Prussian absolutism’ in P.G. Dwyer (ed.) The Rise of Prussia, 1700–1830 (UK, 2000)
Clark, Christopher, Iron kingdom: the rise and downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947 (UK, 2006)
Count von Seckendorf: On Frederick William I, c1726–1734 (Fordham University online database, Modern History Sourcebook (MHS): The Decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the Rise of Prussia, 1700–1786)
Weigley, Russel F., The age of battles: the quest for decisive warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (London, 1993)
Anderson, M.S., Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713–1789 (UK, 2000)
Frederick William I — “the Soldier King”-, Instructions on the Formation and Functioning of the General Directory, December 20, 1722) (German History in Documents and Images (G.H.D.I.), 1648–1815, no. 4, doc. 7)
Political Testament of Frederick II -”the Great”-, 1752 ((G.H.D.I.), 1648–1815, no. 4, doc. 7)
Scott, H.M., The birth of a great power system, 1740–1815 (United Kingdom, 2006)
Hubatsch, Walther, Frederick the Great of Prussia: Absolutism and Administration (London, 1975)
Frederick William I — “the Soldier King”-, Demands Unvarnished Information from the Pomeranian Commissariat, July 20, 1722 ((G.H.D.I.), 1648–1815, no. 4, doc. 5)
Dorn, Walter L., ‘The Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century III’ in Political Science Quarterly, 47 (1932)
Showalter, Dennis E., The wars of Frederick the Great (New York, 1996)
Introduction of the Brandenburg-Prussian Canton System of Military Recruitment [Kantonreglement], issued by Frederick William I — “the Soldier King”-, as an Order to General Field Marshal Albrecht Konrad Finck von Finckenstein, May 1, 1733 ((G.H.D.I.), 1648–1815, no. 6, doc. 4)
Willerd R. Fann, ‘Peacetime attrition in the army of Frederick William I, 1713–1740’ in Central European History, 11 (1978)
